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INTRODUCTION
The #MeToo movement of 2017 and various workers movements spurred
an increased awareness of protectionist legal devices preventing victims from
acquiring just relief through the legal system. Many viewed involuntary
contractual arbitration clauses as a source of injustice. In response to these social
movements and the Supreme Court’s decision in Epic Systems v. Lewis, federal
lawmakers reintroduced the Restoring Justice for Workers Act. 1 The Act aims
to end involuntary arbitration clauses and protect employees’ right to pursue
claims in court. 2 Lawmakers sought to provide recourse unavailable through
arbitration for victims of wage theft, discrimination, and harassment. 3

*
Tyler John Blackington will graduate from Emory Law School in May 2023. He wants to thank his
parents Bradley and Stephanie, his sister Courtney, his Comment Advisor, Associate Dean Leslie Carroll,
ECGAR Staff Member Evan Nelson, and, most importantly, his cat Manny for their support during this endeavor.
1
Press Release, Bobby Scott, Representative, House of Representatives, SCOTT & NADLER
REINTRODUCE THE RESTORING JUSTICE FOR WORKERS ACT (July 29, 2021), https://bobbyscott.
house.gov/media-center/press-releases/scott-nadler-reintroduce-the-restoring-justice-for-workers-act.
2
Id.
3
Id.
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The usage of compulsory arbitration clauses proliferated in the mid-1990s.
Only two percent of employees operating within the United States were subject
to mandatory arbitration clauses in 1992. 4 In 2017, fifty-five percent of these
employees were subjected to mandatory arbitration clauses. 5 Today, many
nonunion American companies include involuntary arbitration clauses in their
employment contracts. 6 Although 60 million working Americans are subject to
mandatory arbitration clauses, only 1 in 10,400 of these employees file claims
per year. 7 In 2020, plaintiffs won a recovery in only 1.6 percent of cases
arbitrated subject to a compulsory arbitration clause. 8 This Comment argues that
the laws surrounding “forced” mandatory arbitration clauses need significant
reform. Specifically, this Comment focuses on a recently decided Ninth Circuit
case, Chamber of Commerce v. Bonta, which created a circuit split among the
First and Fourth Circuits’ interpretations of the validity of nonconsensual
arbitration clauses in the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).
This Comment examines a circuit split regarding the application of Section
(§) 2 of the FAA. This Comment features four parts. Part I provides background
information on arbitration and the FAA. Part II introduces Kindred Nursing v.
Clark, a landmark Supreme Court case discussing arbitration clauses. This part
continues with a discussion on the First and Fourth Circuit cases discussing
arbitration clauses, Securities Industry Association v. Connolly and Saturn
Distribution Corporation v. Williams, and Chamber of Commerce v. Berecca
and Chamber of Commerce v. Bonta, the cases creating a circuit split,
respectively. Part III argues the Ninth Circuit improperly decided the issue
before its Court and runs afoul of the FAA. This analysis includes an
examination of the statute’s language, congressional intent, and various theories
proposed by legal researchers. Part IV concludes the Comment. The Part regards
California’s new bill unconstitutional as written but proper public policy. Thus,
the Supreme Court should enjoin AB 51 as written. I argue Congress should
enact a bill similar to AB 51 in the interest of public policy.

4
Alexander J. S. Colvin, ECON. POLICY INST., The Growing Use of Mandatory Arbitration: Access to
the courts is now barred for more than 60 million American Workers (2017), https://www.epi.org/files/pdf/
135056.pdf.
5
Id.
6
Abha Bhattarai, WASH. POST, As closed-door arbitration soared last year, workers won cases against
employers just 1.6 percent of the time, (Oct. 27, 2021, 7:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2021/10/
27/mandatory-arbitration-family-dollar/.
7
Eliza Jones, Note, Nail in the Coffin: The Mandatory Arbitration Epidemic on Employee Sexual
Harassment Claims, 50 U. Mem. L. Rev. 799, 803 (2020).
8
Bhattarai, supra note 6.
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BACKGROUND

A. Catalysts for the Federal Arbitration Act
The necessity for a federal arbitration law stemmed from English Common
Law tradition. Specifically, the common law doctrines of ouster and revocability
allowed state and federal courts to invalidate any arbitration clause and compel
parties to adjudication. 9 As stated by the House of Representatives in 1924:
The need for the law arises from an anachronism of our American law.
Some centuries ago, because of the jealousy of the English courts for
their own jurisdiction, they refused to enforce specific agreements to
arbitrate upon the ground that the courts were thereby ousted from
their jurisdiction. This jealousy survived for so long a period that the
principle became firmly embedded in the English common law and
was adopted with it by the American courts. The courts have felt that
the precedent was too strongly fixed to be overturned without
legislative enactment, although they have frequently criticized the rule
and recognized its illogical nature and the injustice which results from
it. 10

The federal government, commercial organizations, and the American Bar
Association (ABA) cited three additional reasons for a national arbitration law.
These bodies believed the public demanded a new system and the contemporary
system operated too slowly for commercial organizations. 11 Lastly, arbitration
proponents believed arbitration provides “more just conclusions.” 12
In Home Insurance Corporation of New York v. Morse, the United States
Supreme Court considered the validity of a Wisconsin statute requiring a
nonresident domestic company to file particular paperwork with Wisconsin’s
government to conduct intrastate business operations. 13 The statute required the
corporation to appoint an agent under a form containing the following: “[a]nd
said company agrees that suits commenced in the State courts of Wisconsin shall
not be removed by the acts of said company into the United States Circuit or

9
David Horton, Federal Arbitration Act Preemption, Purposivism, and State Public Policy, 101 Geo.
L.J. 1217, 1219 (2013).
10
H.R.Rep. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 1–2 (1924).
11
Proceedings of the Fourth Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association, 4 ANNU. REP. A.B.A.
5, 77 (1881).
12
Report of the Special Committee Appointed to Consider and Report Whether the Present Delay and
Uncertainty in Judicial Administration Can Be Lessened, and If So, by What Means, 8 ANNU. REP. A.B.A.
323, 357 (1885).
13
Home Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Morse, 87 U.S. 445, 445 (1874).

BLACKINGTON_6.9.22

94

6/13/2022 4:05 PM

EMORY CORPORATE GOVERNANCE & ACCOUNTABILITY REVIEW

[Vol. 9

Federal courts.” 14 The Plaintiff corporation sold an insurance policy to the
Defendant, who subsequently sued Plaintiff for losses sustained under the
policy. 15 Upon the Plaintiff’s petition to remove the case to a federal circuit
court, Wisconsin’s state court blocked removal and ordered the action to proceed
in Wisconsin’s courts. 16
The Supreme Court discussed the state’s power over corporations. When a
state allows a corporation to conduct activities within its borders, it may impose
any legitimate term or condition it sees fit. 17 However, the state does not have
absolute power to impose any term it sees fit. The Court held each United States
citizen possesses an inherent right to “all the courts of the country” and to invoke
the protections those courts allow. 18 The Supreme Court underscored an
important legal distinction regarding binding contracts that provide for court
selection, including arbitration contracts. A citizen may waive his right to the
courts under any valid agreement. 19 However, he may not “bind himself in
advance by an agreement, which may be specifically enforced, thus to forfeit his
rights at all times and on all occasions, whenever the case may be presented.” 20
A corporation has the same right to the protection of laws and the same right to
appeal as a natural citizen. 21 Therefore, the Court declared the agreement illegal
and void for ousting the courts of their legal jurisdiction and allowed the
corporation to remove the case to a federal court. 22
In McKenna v. Lyle, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania assessed an
arbitration clause created after a partnership dissolution. 23 On February 15,
1890, partners filed a bill to dissolve their partnership and settle partnership
accounts. 24 The partners later agreed to refer all matters under dispute to binding
arbitration. 25 After months, the arbitrators notified the partners of their final
Id. at 446.
Id.
16
Id.
17
Id. at 448.
18
Id. at 451.
19
Id.
20
Id. at 452.
21
Id. at 455.
22
Id., see also id. (“And where the stipulation, though not against the policy of the law, yet is an effort to
divest the ordinary jurisdiction of the common tribunals of justice, such as an agreement in case of dispute to
refer the same to arbitration, a court of equity will not any more than a court of law interfere to enforce the
agreement, but it will leave the parties to their own good pleasure in regard to such agreements. The regular
administration of justice might be greatly impeded or interfered with by such stipulations if they were
specifically enforced.”).
23
McKenna v. Lyle, 26 A. 777 (Pa. 1893).
24
Id.
25
Id.
14
15
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decision before their official declaration shortly thereafter. 26 The Defendant
notified the arbitrators of his revocation of their authority and of his intention to
contest their decision. 27 The Plaintiff’s executrix filed a complaint with the
Pennsylvania courts.
The Court invalidated the arbitrator’s award because it found the Defendant
successfully revoked the arbitration clause before the arbitrator officially
declared the award. 28 The Court held the arbitration agreement valid because it
appeared in a properly executed contract. 29 However, the common law doctrine
of revocability permitted a party to revoke the clause by refusing to proceed or
by the vacancy of an arbitrator. 30 The doctrine allowed a party to revoke at any
time before the arbitrator enters his final decision. 31 Notably, this Court
determined that the defendant properly revoked although he collected and
deposited proceeds from the arbitrator’s decision into his bank account before
revoking the arbitrator’s decision. 32 After allowing the revocation of the
arbitration clause, the Court charted the proper channel to hear a dispute after
arbitration terminates. The Court held it was the court’s duty to decide the
controversy on the merits upon the revocation of an arbitration clause. 33
Lastly, another major impetus to the enactment of a federal arbitration law
stemmed from businesses’ hopes for quicker resolutions to corporate
controversies. At the Fourth Annual Meeting of the ABA, corporations lobbied
the ABA to write a uniform arbitration law. 34 A member discussed his locality’s
cotton market. Cotton producers and buyers created a “Cotton Exchange” for the
purpose of quickly resolving disputes via arbitration among its members. 35
Before the Exchange, cotton traders brought claims before the local courts. The
claim resolution process took three to four years. 36 The ABA speaker did not
26

Id.
Id.
28
Id. at 779.
29
Id. at 778.
30
McKenna v. Lyle, 26 A. 778 (Pa. 1893)., see also Jones v. Harris, 59 Miss. 214, 220 (“Either party to
a submission may, at any time before an award made, revoke the authority of the arbitrators.”).
31
McKenna v. Lyle, 26 A. 778 (Pa. 1893)., see also Samuel Willison, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts
§ 1927 (1920) (“It follows from the revocability of the submission that a revocation by either party to the
arbitration of the authority given by him to the arbitrators will invalidate any award made thereafter” and “The
only redress for breach of an agreement to refer is an action for damages, and in such an action if arbitration has
not been begun and no expenses incurred, only nominal damages can be recovered.”).
32
Id.
33
Id.
34
Proceedings of the Fourth Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association, 4 ANNU. REP. A.B.A.
5, 77 (1881).
35
Id.
36
Id.
27

BLACKINGTON_6.9.22

96

6/13/2022 4:05 PM

EMORY CORPORATE GOVERNANCE & ACCOUNTABILITY REVIEW

[Vol. 9

provide statistics regarding the speed the Exchange arbitrated disputes but
ensured the arbitration process resolved claims significantly quicker. 37 Thus, the
ABA tasked itself with writing a federal arbitration law to overturn judicial
hostility to arbitration and to ensure speedy trials for corporations.
B. The Federal Arbitration Act
The ABA was tasked with drafting a federal arbitration act, 38 so a proper
understanding of the FAA’s original scope must include the ABA’s
considerations while constructing the FAA. Notably, the ABA indicated that the
scope of the final act should extend only to commercial and maritime
transactions. The ABA hoped to “induce merchants to make use” of arbitration
as a way to dispose of controversies amongst themselves without court
involvement. 39 The ABA noted the “advantages of commercial arbitration in a
great number of commercial transactions is so great” that courts must “carefully
safeguard” the validity of arbitration agreements in commercial contexts. 40
Further, the ABA noted “any well informed lawyer would agree” that
“arbitration has a valuable contribution to make to the settlement of commercial
disputes.” 41 The ABA did not consider the validity of arbitration clauses within
employment contracts or other contracts. The record only discusses arbitration
as it relates to commercial and maritime contracts. This conclusion seems
bolstered by the ABA’s discussion on the potential growth of arbitration clauses
if their proposed act passes. The ABA stated that the organization should
maintain a sympathetic attitude toward more extended uses of arbitration, but
the ABA will “always bear in mind, however, that its appropriate field in respect
to future disputes is somewhat qualified and limited.” 42
Congressional interpretation and discussion of the ABA’s template leading
to the FAA’s enactment proves consistent with the ABA’s discussion and
construction. The House of Representatives’ debates expressly limits the scope
of arbitration to commercial disputes. 43 Further, the Committee on Commerce,
Trade, and Commercial Law indicated the act only encompasses maritime
transactions, transactions involving commerce, or transactions involving
37

Id.
Report of the Committee on Commerce, Trade and Commercial Law, 44 ANNU. REP. A.B.A. 309,
355 (1921).
39
Report of the Committee on Uniform State Laws, 48 ANNU. REP. A.B.A. 560, 585 (1925).
40
Id. (emphasis added).
41
Id. (emphasis added).
42
Id. at 584.
43
Proceedings of the Forty-Eighth Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association Held at Detroit
Michigan, 48 ANNU. REP. A.B.A. 29, 146 (1925).
38
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commerce among the states. 44 Governmental bodies believed “commerce”
referred to trade “among the several states or with foreign nations, or in any
territory of the United States or in the District of Columbia, or between any such
territory and another, or between any such territory and any state or foreign
nation, or between the District of Columbia and any state or territory or foreign
nation.” 45 Therefore, the act seems to only contemplate interstate commerce.
In 1924, while Congress tinkered with various iterations of the Act, the
Supreme Court considered whether a dispute arising from a maritime contract
may be arbitrated under a New York statute, and if so, whether the state law
conflicts with the Constitution. 46 Prior to the statute at issue’s passage, the state’s
common and case law held the specific performance of arbitration within the
court’s discretion, and those seeking to enforce an arbitration clause could not
use a motion to stay. 47 The statute required the specific performance of
arbitration contracts, but did not provide for maritime contracts. 48 The New
York Supreme Court and Appellate Division ordered the parties to proceed
under arbitration as provided under their agreement. 49 However, New York’s
Court of Appeals reversed. It found that the admiralty courts hold exclusive
jurisdiction over controversies relating to admiralty and the state had no power
to compel arbitration. 50
The Supreme Court overturned the Court of Appeals’ holding. It decided
New York had concurrent, in personam jurisdiction with the admiralty courts
and possessed the power to compel the specific performance of a maritime
contract’s arbitration clause. 51 The ABA’s arbitration committee realized this
decision strengthened their proposed bill and sent a letter to the Senate and
House Judiciary Committees containing the following:
The decision goes a long way toward reversing the ancient error of
revocability in arbitration agreements and would seem to remove the
last vestige of doubt concerning the value of the public policy of
making such agreements valid and enforceable. It gives added point to
the necessity of putting all the federal courts on a parity of jurisdiction
and furnishing a ready and inexpensive method of securing relief. I

44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51

Id.
Id.
Red Cross Line v. Atl. Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109, 119 (1924).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Red Cross Line, 264 U.S. at 124.
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urge on behalf of the Committee on Commerce Trade and Commercial
Law of the American Bar Association that you read the opinion. 52

Shortly thereafter, Congress passed the FAA to ensure the validity and
enforcement of arbitration agreements and to ensure arbitration agreements
“stood on equal footing” with other contractual provisions. 53
The Federal Arbitration Act governs arbitration agreements involving
interstate commerce or maritime transactions. 54 The FAA explicitly excludes
“contracts of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of worker engaged
in foreign or interstate commerce.” 55 The FAA did not apply to arbitration
contracts involving an employee transporting goods interstate. 56 This exclusion
does not apply to those transporting services or people interstate.
The FAA appears anomalous in the arena of federal court jurisdiction. It does
not create independent federal question jurisdiction despite creating a national
substantive law regulating arbitration agreements. 57 After the FAA’s adoption,
federal courts split regarding whether to apply federal law when assessing the
enforceability of an arbitration clause in diversity jurisdiction cases. The
Supreme Court determined the FAA created a foundation for federal substantive
law under the Commerce Clause. 58 Although federal courts began applying the
FAA to arbitration cases brought under diversity jurisdiction, state courts could
apply their own substantive law to arbitration controversies. However, the
Supreme Court later extended the scope of FAA substantive law to the state
courts. 59
FAA Section 2 ensures arbitration agreements are valid and enforceable to
the extent of contract law grounds at law or in equity. 60 Section 2 requires the
parties place their arbitration agreement in writing. 61 From Congress’ mandate,
52
Report of the Special Committee on Change of Date of Presidential Inauguration, 47 ANNU. REP.
A.B.A. 276, 282 (1924).
53
Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. Of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 473 (1989).
54
9 U.S.C.A. § 1
55
Id.
56
Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 112 (2011).
57
Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 16 (1983).
58
Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 87 S. Ct. 1801, 1806–07 (1967).
59
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
60
9 U.S.C.A. § 2 (“A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction
involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction,
or the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an
existing controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”).
61
9 U.S.C.A. § 2.
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the Supreme Court held the FAA represents a liberal policy favoring arbitration
agreements. 62 Therefore, any doubt concerning the scope or validity of
arbitration agreements must be resolved favoring arbitration. 63 The FAA applies
to disputes involving a “contract evidencing a transaction involving
commerce.” 64 The Supreme Court held the FAA’s applicability for any contract
involving commerce includes anything considered “commerce” under the
Commerce Clause. 65
Section 3 of the FAA allows the non-resisting party to request a stay of
litigation if the party resisting arbitration files litigation. 66 The court must
compel the parties to honor the agreement if it determines the parties properly
consented to arbitration. 67 Sections 9 and 10 establish procedures for a
prevailing party to enforce an arbitrated award and for an unsuccessful party to
vacate the arbitrated award. 68 Section 11 allows a court to modify or correct an
arbitrated award. 69 The court holds exclusive power to confirm and enter
judgment on arbitration awards. 70 Its judgment possesses the same effect and
legitimacy as a court judgment. 71
The FAA preempts a state law inconsistent with the FAA’s objectives and
purposes. However, the FAA does not include a section providing this
information. Federal and state courts routinely identify three possible objectives
and purposes of the FAA. A court may find an objective and/or purpose to be:
(1) strictly enforcing arbitration contracts and clauses by its express terms; (2)
promoting arbitration; or (3) ensuring arbitration clauses and contracts are
treated as any other contract. 72
Congress did not intend the FAA to occupy the entire field of arbitration. 73
Federal courts may apply state law to interpret arbitration agreements, and often
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 25 (1991).
Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. 460 U.S. at 8 (1983).
64
9 U.S.C.A. §§ 1, 2.
65
Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc., 539 U.S. 52, 56 (2003).
66
9 U.S.C.A. § 3.
67
9 U.S.C.A. §§ 3, 4.
68
9 U.S.C.A. §§ 9, 10.
69
9 U.S.C.A. § 11 (“Where there was an evident material miscalculation of figures or an evident material
mistake in the description of any person, thing, or property referred to in the award; Where the arbitrators have
awarded upon a matter not submitted to them, unless it is a matter not affecting the merits of the decision upon
the matter submitted; Where the award is imperfect in matter of form not affecting the merits of the
controversy.”).
70
9 U.S.C.A. §§ 13, 208, 307.
71
9 U.S.C.A § 208.
72
D.R. Horton, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 737 F.3d 344, 346–50 (5th Cir. 2013).
73
Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. Of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 473 (1989).
62
63
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apply state contract law to issues regarding formation, validity, and enforcement
of arbitration clauses. 74
II. CASE LAW
A. Kindred Nursing Centers Limited Partnership v. Clark
The Supreme Court’s landmark case discussing mandatory arbitration
clauses provides judicial support for the First and Fourth Circuit Courts’
holdings and runs contrary to Bonta. In Kindred, the Court consolidated two
separate wrongful death claims against a nursing home. 75 The Plaintiffs held
powers of attorney (POA) providing broad authority to manage each Ward’s
affairs. 76 Plaintiffs, as part of their agreement to enroll each’s respective Ward
into Kindred Nursing Centers, were required to sign a contract providing, “all
claims or controversies arising out of or in any way relating to . . . the Resident’s
stay . . . would be resolved through binding arbitration rather than a lawsuit.” 77
Plaintiffs brought individual suits against Kindred Nursing Centers in a
Kentucky state court. 78 The Defendant requested dismissal on grounds that both
Plaintiffs signed binding agreements prohibiting them from bringing the actions
to court. 79 Both the trial and appellate courts denied the Defendant’s request. 80
Upon review, the Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts’ holding. 81
This Court invalidated the mandatory arbitration clauses because the power-ofattorney (POA) did not specifically provide Plaintiffs power to enter into an
arbitration agreement on its principal’s behalf. 82 It noted the state constitution
protects one’s “sacred and inviolate” right of access to court. 83 Because of this
sacred right, agents could only bind their principal if the POA expressly
authorized an agent to enter arbitration agreements. 84 The Kentucky Supreme
Court recognized the FAA precludes specific discrimination against arbitration,

74
Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 488 (1987); Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S.
395, 401 (1967); Great Earth Companies, Inc. v. Simons, 288 F.3d 878, 883 (6th Cir. 2002); Ticknor v. Choice
Hotels Int’l., Inc., 265 F.3d 931, 935 (9th Cir. 2001).
75
Kindred Nursing Centers Ltd. P’ship v. Clark, 137 S. Ct. 1421, 1423 (2017).
76
Id.
77
Id. at 1425–26 (quotations added) (quotations omitted).
78
Id. at 1425.
79
Id.
80
Id.
81
Id.
82
Id.
83
Id. (quotations added).
84
Id.
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but believed its statute applicable to agreements other than arbitration. 85 It
argued its holding applied to all contracts implicating fundamental constitutional
rights. 86 The Court’s dissent expounded on the FAA’s preclusion of rules which
“single out arbitration agreements.” 87 It argued the state’s ruling discriminately
disfavored arbitration agreements by creating a legal rule applicable only to
involuntary arbitration clauses. 88
The Supreme Court rejected the state’s justification for requiring a clear
statement in a POA for an agent to bind the principal when signing contracts
affecting the principal’s sacred legal rights. 89 The Court found no record of a
Kentucky court requiring a POA to expressly authorize an agent to execute
contracts affecting other constitutional rights. 90 The state’s constitution protects
rights to one’s property. 91 If the state’s justification proved consistent, an agent
would require authority before selling his principal’s household items.
The Supreme Court overturned the Kentucky Supreme Court’s holding by
focusing on equal treatment principles. 92 The FAA holds arbitration agreements
valid “upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract.” 93 In AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, the Court held that the
judiciary cannot invalidate arbitration agreements based on legal rules
applicable “only to arbitration or that derive their meaning from the fact that an
agreement to arbitrate is at issue.” 94 There, the Defendant required its customers
to bring all disputes and potential causes of action before an arbitrator. 95 The
clause also prevented class-wide arbitration. 96 That Court determined the FAA’s
purpose of ensuring the adequate enforcement of valid arbitration agreements
and the existence of a valid agreement ensured the arbitration clause’s provisions
be followed. 97
The Court followed precedent in holding Kindred’s arbitration agreement
valid. It found the state’s decision adopted a legal rule hinging on the “primary
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1427.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1426.
9 U.S.C. § 2.
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 339 (2011).
Id. at 1742.
Id.
Id. at 1479.
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characteristic of an arbitration agreement—namely, a waiver of the right to go
to court and receive a jury trial.” 98 Therefore, the state’s decision directly
conflicted with the FAA’s objective of barring the creation of different classes
of rules for arbitration contracts.
The Plaintiffs argued Kentucky’s rule only affects contract formation, as it
bars those without specific authority from executing arbitration contracts.
Plaintiffs believed the FAA inapplicable to contract formation controversies
because the FAA provides states the authority to assess the validity of contract
formation. 99 Plaintiffs interpreted the FAA as governing only contract
enforcement. 100 The Supreme Court rejected this argument, stating “a rule
selectively finding arbitration contracts invalid because improperly formed fares
no better under the Act than a rule selectively refusing to enforce those
agreements once properly made.” 101 Further, adopting Plaintiff’s reasoning
would allow the states to impermissibly burden the formation of arbitration
contracts. 102 Therefore, the Court reaffirmed the FAA’s scope as inclusive of
contract formation and contract enforcement. 103 In a short dissent, Justice
Thomas stated the FAA has no applicability in state court proceedings.104 Justice
Thomas wholly supported Kentucky’s interpretation of the FAA. 105
B. Securities Industry Association v. Connolly
In Connolly, the First Circuit assessed whether the FAA preempted a
Massachusetts’ law, §§ 12.204(G)(1)(a)-(c). 106 Part of the Massachusetts law
provided the following:
(i) bar(red) firms from requiring individuals to enter PDAAs as a
nonnegotiable condition precedent to account relationships, §
12.204(G)(1)(a);
(ii)
order(ed)
the
prohibition
brought
“conspicuously” to the attention of prospective customers, §
12.204(G)(1)(b); and (iii) demand(ed) full written disclosure of “the
legal effect of the pre-dispute arbitration contract or clause” 107

98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107

Kindred Nursing Centers Ltd. P’ship v. Clark, 137 S. Ct. 1421, 1427 (2017).
Id. at 1428.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1429 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id.
Sec. Indus. Ass’n v. Connolly, 883 F.2d 1114, 1116 (1st Cir. 1989).
Id. at 1117 (parentheses added).

BLACKINGTON_6.9.22

2022]

6/13/2022 4:05 PM

CIRCUIT SPLIT ANALYSIS

103

Significantly, the regulations did not govern mandatory arbitration on their face.
Rather, they govern agreements which require customers to sign an involuntary
arbitration provision. 108
The First Circuit assessed whether the arbitration agreements in question
implicated the FAA. The Court determined the laws implicated interstate and
international commerce and fell within the FAA’s authority. 109 It determined
that Congress did not intend the FAA to occupy the entire field of arbitration
law. 110 Therefore, the FAA does not operate to the entire exclusion of state
law. 111 However, the FAA preempts any state law conflicting with its operation
or purpose. 112 Because Congress failed to “explicitly detail the dimensions of
displacement,” the Court had to determine whether this state law interfered with
congressional intent under the FAA. 113 The First Circuit analyzed the
Massachusetts law under the framework that any state regulation serving as an
obstacle to Congress’ purposes and ends cannot exist. 114
Congress intended the FAA to serve as a liberal policy favoring arbitration
agreements. 115 States cannot authorize rules and regulations governing
arbitration that differ from rules and regulations governing other contractual
devices. 116 The Court found the regulations “inhospitable” to arbitration by
forbidding brokers from requiring customers to sign compulsory arbitration
clauses in exchange for representation and ordering brokers to fully disclose the
effects of pre-dispute arbitration clauses. 117
The First Circuit discussed methods in which a state may remedy the
perceived problems associated with arbitration contracts. States may create laws
governing issues “concerning the validity, revocability, and enforceability of
contracts generally.” 118 It could declare as presumptively unenforceable

Id. at 1122.
Id.
110
Id. at 1117 (citing Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468
(1989); New England Energy, Inc. v. Keystone Shipping Co., 855 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir.1988), cert. denied, 489
U.S. 1077 (1989)).
111
Id.
112
Id.
113
Id.
114
Id. (citing Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 108 S. Ct. 1145, 1151 (1988); Cal. Coastal Comm’n v.
Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572, 592 (1987); Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984); Hines
v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
115
Id.
116
Id.
117
Id.
118
Id. at 1121 (citing Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492 n.9 (1987)).
108
109
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adhesion contracts, which include those containing mandatory arbitration and
other forms of adhesion. 119 However, the Court rejected the state’s justification
for the law’s sole applicability to arbitration contracts. 120 The state argued it
treated arbitration agreements like other contracts by regulating them as
extensively as necessary “for the public weal.” 121 The Court determined the
state’s law and argument represented the anti-arbitration sentiment Congress
hoped to cure by passing the FAA. 122
Massachusetts case law required a party to voluntarily enter a contract and
requires unconscionability to disprove the voluntary element of a contract
formation. 123 The regulations created a more stringent standard to validly
execute an arbitration clause by requiring certain negotiations, disclosures, and
explanations. 124 By doing so, the law dissuaded parties from creating mandatory
arbitration clauses and/or undermined the clause’s enforceability. 125 Therefore,
the First Circuit held the regulations invalid for creating a tougher standard for
arbitration agreements than other contractual devices. 126
Congress decreed that courts should resolve all doubts in favor of arbitration
when FAA issues arise. 127 Therefore, the First Circuit Court held the state’s law
actually conflicted with the FAA and federal policy. 128 The state specifically
limited the law’s scope by regulating only contracts to arbitrate. 129 The state’s
decision to extend penalties to parties attempting to enforce an arbitration
contract wholly eroded the FAA’s policy objectives. 130 Further, “even if no
penalty were attached to their use,” the regulation still stands at odds with the
FAA’s policy of endorsing mandatory and nonmandatory arbitration
agreements. 131

119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131

Id.
Id. at 1120 (the state conceded its regulation applied only to arbitration agreements).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1124.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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C. Saturn Distribution Corporation v. Williams
In Saturn, the Fourth Circuit assessed the validity of a Virginia law
prohibiting automobile manufacturers and dealers from executing contracts
including mandatory alternative dispute resolution clauses. 132 Further, it
required a manufacturer to submit its standard franchise agreements to a state
representative for approval. 133 The Plaintiff included a mandatory arbitration
clause in its franchise agreements. 134 Upon submission of an agreement to the
state, the state notified Plaintiff that the agreement was invalid under Virginia
law unless the Plaintiff’s agreement contained an arbitration opt out
provision. 135 The district court held the FAA did not preempt the state’s law and
allowed the state to prevent the formation of involuntary arbitration agreements
among dealers and manufacturers. 136
The Fourth Circuit analyzed the purposes of the FAA. It concluded that
Congress enacted the FAA to promote arbitration agreements and make
arbitration a viable option to parties wishing to mitigate the delays and costs of
formal litigation. 137 Therefore, any state law creating an exclusive class for
arbitration provisions and/or limiting their enforceability cannot be valid. 138
Defendants offered a similar argument as those in Connolly. It argued
Virginia law regulated the formation of arbitration agreements, while the FAA’s
scope only covered laws regulating existing arbitration agreements. 139 The
Court rejected this argument. 140 It stated that a regulation cannot refuse to
enforce and/or revoke existing arbitration agreements on the basis that the
contract did not “comply with the rules of contract formation applicable only to
arbitration provisions.” 141 The Congress enacting the FAA intended it to block
any state’s attempt to lessen the enforceability of arbitration agreements. 142

Saturn Distrib. Corp. v. Williams, 905 F.2d 719, 721 (4th Cir. 1990).
Id.
134
Id.
135
Id.
136
Id. at 722.
137
Id. (citing Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 220 (1985) (quoting H.R.Rep. No. 96,
68th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1924)).
138
Id. at 723.
139
Id.
140
Id.
141
Id.; see also Webb v. R. Rowland & Co., Inc., 800 F.2d 803, 806–07 (8th Cir. 1986) (holding that a
statute cannot make an otherwise valid arbitration agreement invalid because the clause did not follow state law
requiring the clause to be accompanied by notice in ten-point type write that the contract includes a mandatory
arbitration clause).
142
Id.
132
133
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Therefore, the FAA’s scope necessarily includes both prospective and existing
arbitration agreements. 143 Because the FAA applied, the Court assessed whether
the FAA preempted the Virginia Statute.
Another Fourth Circuit case involved a motion to stay proceedings pending
an arbitration decision pursuant to the FAA. 144 In Supak & Sons Manufacturing
Company, Inc. v. Pervel Industries, Inc., the Court determined general contract
formation rules applied equally to all contracts, including contracts with
mandatory arbitration clauses. 145 The Court included dicta indicating the FAA
“would preempt a state rule of contract formation which applied only to
arbitration clauses and which placed an unreasonable burden on the parties’
ability to commit themselves to arbitration.”146 This Court made that dicta
binding and determined that the Virginia law placed an unreasonable burden on
the Plaintiff’s right to negotiate an arbitration agreement in its contracts. 147
The Court held the law preempted by the FAA because it placed greater
restrictions on arbitration clauses than other contractual clauses. 148 Notably, the
Court concluded that the state law forbid only nonnegotiable arbitration
provisions while leaving the law regarding negotiable arbitration agreements
unchanged. 149 However, the law violated the FAA because Virginia law permits
contracting parties to include nonnegotiable terms. This created a separate class
for arbitration agreements. 150 The Fourth Circuit found the reasoning of
Connolly persuasive because the Massachusetts law’s effect of creating a distinct
class for arbitration agreements while leaving the state’s other contractual
provision laws unchanged created the same discriminatory effect on arbitration
as the Virginia law. 151
Additionally, the Court rejected the state’s argument the law applied to any
contract provision denying dealers access to Virginia’s courts. The state argued
the law does not solely exclude nonnegotiable arbitration provisions because
nonnegotiable forum-selection provisions could be voided under the statute. 152
The Court rejected this argument because the FAA instructs courts to focus on
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152

Id.
Supak & Sons Mfg. Co. v. Pervel Indus. Inc., 593 F.2d 135 (4th Cir. 1979).
Id. at 137.
Id.
Id. at 136.
Saturn Distrib. Corp. v. Williams, 905 F.2d 719, 724 (4th Cir. 1990).
Id. at 725.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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whether the statute burdens arbitration in methods inapplicable to general
contracts. 153 It found the law specifically burdened arbitration agreements in
methods inapplicable to general contracts.
The Court expanded on the analysis in Connolly by discussing a test to
determine whether a regulation creates a rule specifically enforceable against a
limited class of contractual provisions or whether the rule has broad
applicability, and is thus valid, within the state’s body of contract law. 154 To
determine whether a rule is tailored too narrowly to a class of contractual
provisions, the courts must assess the state’s general body of common and
statutory contract law. 155 Here, FAA preempts the state law because it only
invalidated arbitration agreements included as a mandatory clause. 156 In general,
Virginia’s statutory law did not prevent parties from making certain contractual
provisions nonnegotiable. 157 Specifically, Virginia had no law requiring a
mandatory clause in a standardized agreement to include an opt out provision. 158
Moreover, Virginia case law provided that clauses within standardized
agreements involving parties of unequal bargaining power are valid if executed
properly and not otherwise unconscionable. 159 The Court determined Virginia
had no preexisting general contract law or doctrine limiting involuntary
provisions in standard contracts. 160 Therefore, the Court determined the
regulation created a rule only enforceable against arbitration provisions and
violated the FAA’s pro-arbitration policy and objective. 161 Ultimately, the state
cannot unreasonably burden the formation and existence of mandatory
arbitration clauses without extending its ban on mandatory provisions to all
contracts. 162
Notably, this Court rejected the Defendant’s argument that the Virginia
statute does not conflict with the FAA because the regulation merely ensures
“consensual, rather than forced arbitration.” 163 The Defendant cited dicta in Volt,
which stated arbitration “under the Act is a matter of consent, not coercion” to
argue the FAA’s pro-arbitration policy does not extend to mandatory arbitration
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163

Id.
Id. at 725.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 726; Webb v. R. Rowland & Co., Inc., 800 F.2d 803, 805 (8th Cir. 1986).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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provisions in standardized agreements. 164 This Court rejected the Defendant’s
argument, although this argument was similar to the Defendant’s victorious
argument in Bonta. This Court held that the Supreme Court in Volt issued no
ruling or dicta on the use of mandatory arbitration clauses within standardized
agreements under the FAA. 165 The discussion of “consent” in Volt only indicates
that the Act cannot impose arbitration on parties to a contract without mutual
consent. 166 Mutual consent is not defeated by a party requiring the other to
execute an arbitration clause as a condition precedent to execution of the
contract. 167
The Fourth Circuit rejected a public policy argument advanced by the state.
The Defendant argued its statute aimed at preventing coercive agreements
arising from asymmetry in bargaining power between automobile manufacturers
and dealers. 168 The Court held the FAA’s objective of “plac[ing] arbitration
agreements on equal footing with other contracts” outweighs the state’s
legitimate concern. 169 Further, requiring another party to agree to an arbitration
clause as a condition for the offering party’s acceptance does not render a
contract nonconsensual. 170 This decision parallels other Supreme Court
decisions. 171 The dissent argued to uphold the state law because of his belief the
FAA does not preempt state rules of contract formation. 172
D. Chamber of Commerce v. Bonta
1. Background
California’s Governor signed Assembly Bill 51 (“AB 51”) in October 2019.
AB 51 prohibits California employers from conditioning employment and/or the
continuation of employment and the receipt of employee benefits on the
Id.; Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989).
Id.
166
Id. at 727.
167
Id.
168
Id.
169
Id.
170
Id. (noting the offeree could forgo the agreement if it did not wish to arbitrate).
171
See, e.g., Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Exp., Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 478, 484 (1989) (holding a
predispute agreement between investors and brokerage firm mandating arbitration enforceable); Perry v.
Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 491 (1987) (holding mandatory arbitration agreement between investment brokerage and
its employees valid although statute designed to advance state’s policy to ensure employees’ constitutional right
to the court system); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 8 (1984) (holding that the FAA’s scope applied to
the states and invalidated a California law making arbitration agreements under the FAA unenforceable in
California state courts).
172
Saturn Dist. Corp v. Williams, 905 F.2d 719, 730 (4th Cir. 1990).
164
165
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employee waiving any “right, forum, or procedure.” 173 Further, the bill prohibits
employers from discriminating, retaliating, threatening, or withholding
employment from employees and applicants who refuse to agree to mandatory
arbitration clauses. 174 Employers violating AB 51 become subject to damages
for unlawful employment practices under Fair Employment and Housing Act
(FEHA) and pay the plaintiff’s legal fees. 175 AB 51 also provides criminal
sanctions against employers violating the Bill, including six months’
imprisonment or a $1,000 fine. 176
Prior to the passage of AB 51, the California Assembly sought to pass two
similar bills addressing involuntary waivers of right. 177 These two bills, AB
2616 and AB 3080, prohibited the mandatory waiver of an individual’s rights to
court. 178 A California Court of Appeal held AB 2617 discriminated against
arbitration by creating presumptions against arbitration not applicable to
contracts generally. 179 In 2018, the Governor vetoed AB 3080 because of his
belief that it violated the FAA. 180 Citing Kindred, the Governor criticized AB
3080 because the Bill’s advocates based its legal legitimacy on an invalid theory
that the FAA governs only the enforcement of arbitration agreements. 181
AB 51’s advocates expected the Bill to become effective in January 2020. 182
However, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and other business groups filed suit
seeking an injunction against the Bill’s enforcement and judgment that the FAA
preempted AB 51. 183

2. Chamber of Commerce v. Becerra
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of California granted
Plaintiff’s suit requesting a preliminary injunction hearing on the issue of

2019 California Assembly Bill No. 51, California 2019–2020 Regular Session.
Id.
175
Id.
176
Id.
177
Chamber of Com. of U.S. v. Becerra, 438 F. Supp. 3d 1078, 1089 (E.D. Cal. 2020), aff’d in part,
vacated in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Chamber of Com. of U.S. v. Bonta, 13 F.4th 766 (9th Cir. 2021).
178
Id.
179
Id.
180
Id.
181
Id.
182
Natalie C. Kreeger, Roxanne M. Wilson, and John Zaimes, Ninth Circuit Upholds Portions of
California Law Prohibiting the Use of Mandatory Employment Arbitration Agreements (Sept. 29, 2021), https://
www.arentfox.com/perspectives/alerts/ninth-circuit-upholds-portions-california-law-prohibiting-the-usemandatory.
183
Id.
173
174
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whether the FAA preempted AB 51. 184 Plaintiff represented numerous
California businesses requiring arbitration as a condition for employment. 185
AB 51 purports to ensure individuals are not retaliated against for refusing
to consent to arbitration and if consenting, enter the arbitration agreement
voluntarily. 186 The Bill’s author claimed the Bill seeks to prevent forced
arbitration, believing forced arbitration to be “among the most harmful practices
that have enabled widespread abuse.” 187 The State Senate floor analysis
indicates the legislators did not wish to suppress the use of arbitration
agreements, but to ensure voluntary consent as a prerequisite to the validity of
arbitration agreements. 188 At court, Defendants argued AB 51 does not treat
arbitration agreements differently than other contracts or conflict with the
purposes of the FAA, it merely regulates employer behavior. 189
The District Court rejected the Defendant’s argument. The Court focused on
AB 51’s civil and criminal penalty provisions. The bill penalizes employers who
include mandatory arbitration clauses in employment contracts. 190 Notably, the
regulation targets only adhesion clauses requiring a waiver of forum, procedure,
or right. 191 Although waivers of right, forum, and procedure include clauses of
no relation to arbitration, the Court found the legislative history clearly indicates
the bill targets arbitration agreements. 192 Therefore, the Court concluded the
purpose and operation of AB 51 subjects mandatory arbitration clauses to
unequal treatment and is preempted by the FAA. 193
The Court did not find the Defendant’s argument that AB 51 codified the
FAA’s “central tenet” that arbitration is wholly a matter of consent
persuasive. 194 Defendant argued AB 51 furthered the FAA’s guarantee of
consent by preventing predatory practices that cause one to “consent” in take-itor-leave-it employment situations. 195 The Court found the argument persuasive
to the extent that policies ensuring consent and mitigating coercive influences
Becerra, 438 F. Supp. 3d at 1085.
Id.
186
Id. at 1088.
187
Id.
188
Id. at 1090; see also S. Judiciary Analysis at 6 (“AB 51 does not seek to prevent arbitration agreements,
it seeks to “set[] ground rules to ensure that such an agreement is truly voluntary.”).
189
Id. at 1095.
190
Id.
191
Id.
192
Id.
193
Id.
194
Id. at 1097.
195
Id. (quotations added).
184
185
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are consistent with the FAA’s general provisions. 196 However, the Court held
the rule’s application affected arbitration specifically. 197 Similar to the statute in
Kindred, the Court determined AB 51 created additional procedural safeguards
unique to arbitration contracts. Further, it disfavored contracts with the defining
features of arbitration. Therefore, it placed arbitration clauses on unequal footing
with other contracts and ran afoul of the FAA’s equal footing principle. 198 The
Court recognized various employment clauses “may tangentially fall within AB
51’s ambit,” but AB 51’s effect specifically targets arbitration agreements. 199
The Court rejected the Defendant’s argument that AB 51 does not conflict
with the purposes and objectives of the FAA because it merely regulates
behavior prior to the execution of an arbitration agreement. 200 Further, by
requiring consent as a precondition, the state did not create a new contract
defense intended to invalidate otherwise valid arbitration agreements. 201 The
Court found AB 51 invalid because it interfered with the FAA’s clear goal to
promote the formation and enforceability of arbitration agreements. 202 Only the
employer faces civil or criminal sanctions for violation of the law, even if both
voluntarily consent to a mandatory arbitration clause. 203 Fatally, the Court noted
AB 51 includes a provision that the law is not “intended to invalidate a written
arbitration agreement that is otherwise enforceable under the” FAA but does not
absolve employers requiring arbitration. 204 Thus, the Court concluded the FAA
preempts AB 51 because it interferes with the FAA objectives and purposes.
3. Chamber of Commerce v. Bonta
The Ninth Circuit granted the Defendant’s appeal from the district court’s
decision in Becerra enjoining the state from enforcing arbitration agreement

196

Id.
Id.
198
Id.; see also id. at 1098 (“It is AB 51’s embodiment of a legal rule hinging on the primary characteristic
of an arbitration agreement’ and placing arbitration agreements in a class apart from any contract that is the
law’s fatal flaw.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).
199
Id.; see also id. (describing other employment clauses that may fall within AB 51’s ambit: nondisclosure agreements, forum selection clauses, choice-of-law provisions and administrative exhaustion
requirements); and (another factor indicating AB 51 specifically targets arbitration provisions is the “sponsors’
concern regarding an overabundance of arbitration agreements in the California employment market”).
200
Id.
201
Id.
202
Id. at 1099; see also AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 352 (2011) (any law that
“stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress . . .
is pre-empted by the FAA”).
203
Id.
204
Id. at 1100.
197
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regulations under § 432.6(a)—(c). 205 The Appellate Court discussed three types
of federal preemption under the Supremacy Clause. 206 Two types of preemption,
express and field, are not relevant under this FAA analysis. 207 Therefore, the
Court analyzed AB 51 under conflict preemption principles. The Court
highlighted the two versions of conflict preemption, impossibility preemption
and obstacle preemption. 208 Impossibility preemption occurs when compliance
with the application of a state and federal law are impossible. 209 Obstacle
preemption occurs when a state law impedes the execution of a federal law’s
objective and purpose. 210
The Ninth Circuit’s opinion commences with a discussion of FAA’s history.
The Court discussed the FAA’s mandate of ensuring arbitration contracts “are
placed upon the same footing as other contracts” and enforcing arbitration
contracts according to their terms. 211 Notably, the Court pulls a quotation from
Volt that seems to pervade its analysis. The Court noted the FAA does “not
require parties to arbitrate when they have not agreed to do so.” 212 The sentence
preceding and following this Court’s quote selection proves revealing. In the
preceding sentence, the Volt court noted the FAA’s “passage was motivated, first
and foremost, by a congressional desire to enforce agreements into which parties
had entered.” 213 In the line following this Court’s selected quote, the Volt court
stated the FAA “simply requires courts to enforce privately negotiated
agreements to arbitrate, like other contracts, in accordance with their terms.” 214
The Ninth Circuit Court then characterized Supreme Court holdings surrounding
the FAA’s scope as “ruling on the enforceability or validity of executed
agreements to arbitrate, explaining the FAA does not preempt the field of
arbitration. 215 The Court concluded the FAA enactors purported to ensure parties
enter arbitration agreements voluntarily and consensually. 216 From this
conclusion, the Court described involuntary arbitration clauses as contrary to the
Chamber of Com. of U.S. v. Bonta, 13 F.4th 766, 773 (9th Cir. 2021).
Id. at 774 (conflict preemption, express preemption, and field preemption).
207
Id.; see also Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 477
(1989) (“The FAA contains no express preemptive provision, nor does it reflect a congressional intent to occupy
the entire field of arbitration.”).
208
Bonta, 13 F.4th at 774.
209
Id.
210
Id.
211
Id. at 771.
212
Id.
213
Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 478 (1989) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
214
Id.
215
Bonta, 13 F.4th at 771.
216
Id.
205
206
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FAA because mandatory arbitration clauses compel parties to arbitrate when
only one desires arbitration. 217
The Court began its analysis by assessing the relationship between the
FAA’s savings clause and impossibility preemption. The savings clause
provides an arbitration agreement is valid “upon such grounds as exist at law or
in equity for the revocation of any contract.” 218 The savings clause allows
generally applicable contract defenses to invalidate arbitration contracts but
disallows defenses specifically applicable to arbitration. 219 Thus, the equal
footing principal guides impossibility preemption as it relates to the FAA.220
The Court noted that if AB 51 passes the impossibility preemption analysis,
obstacle preemption may bar its validity. If AB 51 obstructs the execution of the
FAA’s purposes and objectives, the bill is preempted and invalid. Notably, the
Court continued its argument that the FAA does not govern arbitration contract
formation. It stated rules that “selectively interfere with the enforcement of
arbitration agreements are therefore” preempted. 221
The Court held the FAA and § 432.6 do not conflict. 222 It found the law does
not facially discriminate against the “enforcement of arbitration agreements.” 223
Nor does the California law create a contract defense providing the “invalidation
or nonenforcement of an agreement to arbitrate.” 224 The Court reasoned that the
section does not invalidate or revoke any arbitration agreement, so the law falls
under the savings clause exception to FAA § 2. Thus, because the law does not
include a rule specifically invalidating arbitration agreements nor outright
prohibit arbitration agreements, the FAA does not preempt § 432.6. 225 The Court
distinguished Kindred because it believed Kindred did not stand for the
proposition that the FAA preempts the state’s regulation of pre-agreement
conduct. 226 It limited the FAA’s scope to the enforcement of arbitration
agreements executed and in existence. 227 § 432.6 does not make any arbitration
agreement invalid or unenforceable, even if created in violation of the statute. 228
217
218
219
220
221
222
223
224
225
226
227
228

Id.
9 U.S.C.A. § 2.
Bonta, 13 F.4th at 772.
Id.
Id. at 775.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 776.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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The Court determined that the statute cannot violate the FAA because its state
statute only regulates conduct prior to the existence of arbitration agreements.
Therefore, the Court held § 432.6 does not fail for impossibility preemption.
The Court proceeded to analyze Kindred in its broader context. The Court
analyzed FAA § 2’s language that written agreements to arbitrate “shall be valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable.” 229 It reasoned that the FAA could only
contemplate arbitration agreements presently in effect. In this case, the court
found the rule applies only in the absence of arbitration agreements while
providing for the validity and enforceability of arbitration agreements. Thus, the
Court believed its District Court read Kindred too broadly in that Kindred cannot
possibly recognize FAA preemption when no arbitration agreement exists. 230
Doing so would impermissibly broaden the scope of the FAA and encroach on
an area historically reserved to the states. 231 Further, it would contradict the
principle that the FAA should not occupy the entire field of arbitration.
The Court next discussed whether § 432.6 conflicts with the purpose and
objectives of the FAA. The Court’s analysis of legislative history and the
historical context of the FAA “demonstrates that Congress was focused on the
enforcement and validity of consensual written agreements to arbitrate and did
not intend to preempt state laws requiring that agreements to arbitrate be
voluntary.” 232 The Court traced the case law history of the FAA and determined
the primary goal of the FAA is to ensure the enforceability and validity of
consensual, written agreements to arbitrate disputes. Here, the Court determined
§ 432.6 does not affect the validity and enforceability of written consensual
arbitration agreements. Further, the only right provided by the FAA is a right to
enter and enforce consensual arbitration agreements. 233 Notably, the court
stated:
Irrespective of AB 51’s enforcement mechanisms, an employee may
attempt to void an arbitration agreement that he was compelled to enter
as a condition of employment on the basis that it was not voluntary. If
a court were to find that such a lack of voluntariness is a generally
applicable contract defense that does not specifically target
agreements to arbitrate, the arbitration agreement may be voided in

229
230
231
232
233

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 778.
Id. at 779.
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accordance with saving clause jurisprudence. This specific question is
not before us, and we do not answer it. 234

These statements prove incredibly head-scratching. The Court determined the
FAA governed the proceedings. Therefore, the savings clause should only allow
AB 51 to stand if voluntariness is a generally applicable contract defense that
does not specifically target agreements to arbitrate in California. If not, then the
voluntariness standard as applied to arbitration contracts is preempted by the
FAA. By punting the question of the general applicability of the voluntariness
defense, the Court provides an easy route for Supreme Court reversal.
Although the Court ruled generally that § 432.6’s regulation of preagreement behavior does not violate the FAA, the civil and criminal penalties
violate the FAA by presenting an obstacle to its purposes and objectives.235 The
Court noted the incongruity of promoting arbitration agreements under federal
law while punishing those using contractual mandatory arbitration clauses under
state law. Therefore, the Court held all statutes providing criminal or civil
sanctions for violation of AB 51 preempted to “the extent that they apply to
executed arbitration agreements covered by the FAA.” 236
The dissent took issue with the law’s disproportionate impact on arbitration
contracts, specifically in regard to the penalties imposed on employers requiring
arbitration clauses in their contracts. 237 The dissenting judge noted the Supreme
Court’s clear guidance that any state rule presenting an obstacle to the FAA’s
objectives and purposes cannot remain valid. 238 The judge’s assessment of AB
51’s legislative history indicated the California legislature’s express intent and
desire to forbid employers from requiring arbitration agreements as an
employment requirement. 239 The judge strengthened this argument by listing
various California laws, similar in nature, preempted by the FAA as adjudicated
by the Supreme Court or other courts in California. 240 The judge also noted
similarities between AB 51 and AB 3080, which prevented employers from
compelling employees to waive the judicial arena as a precondition of
employment. 241 The Governor vetoed the bill for plainly violating federal law
and Supreme Court precedent.
234
235
236
237
238
239
240
241

Id. at 778.
Id. at 780.
Id. at 781.
Id. at 782.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 783.
Id.
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The Supreme Court holds that the FAA invalidates any state law “covertly”
discriminating against arbitration. 242 Here, the legislative history clearly
indicates the California Legislature wrote the bill to covertly discriminate
against arbitration. A California Senate Judiciary Committee report on AB 51
indicated the bill would “be found preempted” if challenged in the Supreme
Court. 243 This same report bragged, “AB 51 seeks to sidestep the preemption
issue” and assured lawmakers the bill “successfully navigates around” Supreme
Court precedent and “avoids preemption by applying only to the condition in
which an arbitration agreement is made, as opposed to banning arbitration
itself.” 244
The judge believed the Kindred holding clearly indicated the FAA
invalidates any state law impeding formation of arbitration contracts.245 The rule
in Kindred specifically impeded an agent to enter an arbitration agreement and
did not place arbitration on an equal footing. 246 Therefore, the Kindred holding
plainly rules a state cannot place special limits on arbitration agreements at
formation inapplicable to other contracts. The judge concluded by stating the
decision clearly stands as an obstacle to the FAA.
III. ANALYSIS
If the United States Supreme Court grants certiorari, it should find the
California statute invalid for creating a new arbitration contract defense
inapplicable to contracts generally and for standing as an obstacle to the
purposes and objectives of the FAA.
The Ninth Circuit misinterpreted Kindred. In Bonta, the Appellate Court
read Kindred narrowly by finding its holding inapplicable to the stages predating
the creation of an arbitration agreement. However, Kindred expressly notes
otherwise. The Supreme Court rejected the Defendant’s argument the FAA does
not apply to contract formation issues. 247
The California statute stands as an obstacle to the purposes and objectives of
the FAA. The FAA purports to enforce arbitration agreements according to its
Id. at 786.
Id. at 784.
244
Id.
245
Id.
246
Id.
247
Kindred Nursing Centers Ltd. P’ship v. Clark, 137 S. Ct. 1421, 1428 (2017)., see also Id., (“A rule
selectively finding arbitration contracts invalid because improperly formed fares no better under the Act than a
rule selectively refusing to enforce those agreements once properly made. Precedent confirms that point”).
242
243
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terms. Congress intended a party to “live up to his agreement.” 248 The dissenting
judge in Bonta listed the California legislature’s anti-arbitration discussions and
plans to prove the intent of AB 51 to obstruct purposes and objectives of the
FAA. 249 This anti-arbitration fervor is the same fervor the Congress enacting the
FAA sought to cure. Further, the Section 432.6(a) expressly disallows employers
from requiring prospective employees to submit for arbitration as a condition of
employment. 250 Therefore, AB 51 clearly stands as an obstacle to the purposes
and objectives of the FAA.
AB 51’s proves most repugnant to the FAA because it creates a contract
defense only applicable to arbitration contracts. California law requires mutual,
voluntary consent to form a contract. 251 Parties consent to all contract terms,
whether an adhesive contract or a nonadhesive contract, even if the weaker party
does not read the contract. 252 California law regards adhesion contracts as an
“inevitable fact of life” for individuals despite not fitting the perfect model of
free contracting by parties of equal bargaining position. 253 Thus, California
allows an employee to consent to arbitration by agreeing to a contract not invalid
by generally applicable contract defenses.
Once the contract becomes formed, acceptance cannot be revoked. 254 Parties
making and accepting the offer have a right to rely and understand the contract
according to its terms. 255 California law regards adhesion contracts as “a
standardized contract that, imposed and drafted by the party of superior
bargaining strength, relegates to the subscribing party only the opportunity to
adhere to the contract or reject it.” 256 Notably, the “freedom of the adhering party
to choose not to contract at all is irrelevant.” 257 Although the states apply federal
substantive law when litigating issues relating to the FAA, states may apply their
procedural law to interpret an arbitration clause, Under California precedent, an

H.R. Rep. No. 68-96, at 1H.R. Rep. No. 68-96, at 1 (1924)
Bonta at 784. (“The reports assured legislators that AB 51 ‘successfully navigates around’ Supreme
Court precedent and ‘avoids preemption by applying only to the condition in which an arbitration agreement is
made, as opposed to banning arbitration itself.’)
250
Cal. Lab. Code § 432.6(a).
251
Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1565, 1567.
252
See Marin Storage & Trucking Inc. v. Benco Contracting & Eng’g, Inc., 107 Cal.Rptr.2d 645 (2001)
and Greve v. Taft Realty Co., 101 Cal. App. 343, 351–52, 281 P. 641 (1929).
253
Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc., 171 Cal.Rptr. 604, 623 P.2d 165 (1981)
254
14 Cal. Jur. 3d Contracts § 88.
255
Id.
256
14 Cal. Jur. 3d Contracts § 10., see also Poublon v. C.H. Robinson Company, 846 F.3d 1251 (9th Cir.
2017).
257
Id.
248
249
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adhesion contract is “essentially a finding of procedural unconscionability.” 258
Courts assess the unconscionability of an arbitration contract under an unduly
burdensome standard. 259
In Donaldson v. Salem Comm, a California court assessed the
conscionability of an arbitration agreement. The issue did not implicate the
FAA. The Defendant’s arbitration clause required all employment claims
submitted to arbitration. 260 The Plaintiff claimed the clause procedurally
unconscionable because the Defendant offered it on a “take it or leave it”
contingency. 261 The Court rejected the Plaintiff’s assertion.
The Court began by discussing unconscionability. The element focuses on
oppression or surprise afforded to the stronger party due to unequal bargaining
power. 262 If unconscionable or outside the reasonable expectations of the weaker
party, the arbitration clause cannot remain valid. 263 The Plaintiff believed the
clause unconscionable because it was offered as a condition of employment. 264
The Court rejected this argument while citing many cases holding a lack of
voluntariness does not cause the invalidation of a compulsory predispute
arbitration agreement. 265 The Plaintiff also argued the clause unconscionable
because it did not explain the rules of arbitration or the arbitration forum. The
Court suggested the clause’s failure to explain arbitration may strengthen an
unconscionability claim but stated the clause’s failure to explain arbitration
insufficient to reach the unconscionability threshold. 266 Therefore, the Court
held the clause not unconscionable and compelled arbitration. 267
By disallowing compulsory arbitration clauses, AB 51 and the Ninth Circuit
created new contract law only applicable to arbitration clauses. Donaldson and
other California case law regard compulsory arbitration clauses as valid. The
258
259

2003).

Dougherty v. Roseville Heritage Partners, 47 Cal. App. 5th 93, 260 Cal. Rptr. 3d 580 (3d Dist. 2020)
14 Cal. Jur. 3d Contracts § 10., see also Gutierrez v. Autowest, Inc., 7 Cal. Rptr. 3d 267 (1st Dist.

260
Donaldson v. Salem Comm, No. 56-2015-00466632-CU-WT-VTA, 2015 WL 10435136, at *1, 1
(Cal.Super. July 16, 2015).
261
Id. at *2.
262
Id. at *2.
263
Id.
264
Id.
265
Id., see Legatree v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps [88 Cal.Rptr.2d 664] (1999) (that an
“arbitration agreement is an adhesion contract does not render it automatically unenforceable as unconscionable.
Courts have consistently held that the requirement to enter into an arbitration agreement is not a bar to its
enforcement”); and Id. (discussing that arbitration agreements offered involuntarily do not render the agreement
invalid unenforceable on grounds of coercion or for lack of voluntariness).
266
Id.
267
Id. at * 1.
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Ninth Circuit stated that an employee may attempt to void a compulsory
arbitration agreement on the basis that it was not voluntary. California law does
not allow the invalidation of all compulsory agreements based on
involuntariness. California law did not require the invalidation of compulsory
arbitration agreements based on involuntariness. Accordingly, the Bill and
decision places arbitration agreements on unequal footing and must not stand.
The Ninth Circuit plainly created a contract law applicable only to arbitration
provisions by upholding AB 51. The Supreme Court never intended to bar, or
even remotely considered barring, involuntary arbitration clauses because of
unequal bargaining power between parties. By holding arbitration contracts on
unequal footing with other contracts, the Ninth Circuit violated Supreme Court
precedent and the Supremacy Clause. AB 51 conflicts with the purposes and
objectives of the FAA
CONCLUSION
Compulsory arbitration clauses seem to harm individuals. Only 1.6 percent
of plaintiffs won recovery in 2020 when subject to a compulsory arbitration
provision. AB 51 represents good public policy and would aid many people.
However, it conflicts with the purposes and objectives of the FAA and creates
new contract law only applicable to arbitration contracts.
Public policy arguments cannot save AB 51 if the Supreme Court grants
certiorari. AB 51 cannot exist harmoniously with the FAA. The Supreme Court
must enjoin AB 51 and reverse Bonta. However, Congress has the power to
amend the FAA to disallow compulsory arbitration clauses. Congress must
follow the guide of the California legislature and forbid compulsory arbitration
clauses for the public’s interest.

